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redit ratings are a quasi-public good, and investors and financial markets regulators need an independent 
assessment of the credit-worthiness of an issuing entity because of information asymmetries and principal agent 
problems. In light of the high volatility of market-based measures and the failure of internal risk management, 
private CRAs are best fit for purpose. However, natural barriers of entry in the rating business and conflicts of interest 
have led to an inflation of ratings and a deterioration in their quality. It would thus appear that CRAs need closer 
supervision. While certainly burdensome and likely to raise barriers of entry, the European Commission's proposal seems 
to be the most sensible solution given the circumstances. Market discipline based on competition and transparency as 
envisioned in the US will lead to a weak surveillance regime, while leaving the regulatory license intact. 
 
1. Introduction 
The credit rating industry is a global business, with three 
leading players (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch) 
controlling over 94% of the global market (European 
Commission 2008b). Credit rating agencies (CRAs) sit at 
the centre of international capital markets. Until recently 
CRAs were seen as neutral information providers, 
capable of objectively assessing the credit risk of a 
certain entity or debt security. From the early 1990s on, 
however, CRAs have been increasingly criticised. From 
the 1994 Mexican Tequila Crisis to the 1997-98 Asian 
Financial Crisis; from the 2001 Enron Scandal to the 
2003 Parmalat bankruptcy, CRAs have been blamed for 
failing to warn investors of imminent corporate or 
sovereign default. The anger directed at these agencies 
indicates the degree of power CRAs enjoy in financial 
markets. The role of CRAs in the subprime financial 
meltdown in exacerbating the financial crisis has become 
startlingly clear, and yet investors and the financial press 
still discuss ratings widely. As capital markets have 
become increasingly global, so has the dominance of the 
leading CRAs.  
This Policy Brief argues that credit ratings are a quasi-
public good, and that investors and financial markets 
regulators need an independent assessment of the credit-
worthiness of an issuing entity because of information 
asymmetries and principal agent problems. In light of the 
high volatility of market-based measures and the failure 
of internal risk management, private CRAs are best fit for 
purpose. However, natural barriers of entry in the rating 
business and conflicts of interest have led to an inflation 
of ratings and a deterioration in their quality. Thus, it 
would appear that CRAs need strict supervision. While 
certainly burdensome and likely to raise barriers of entry, 
the European Commission’s proposal seems to be the 
most sensible solution given the circumstances. Market 
discipline based on competition and transparency as 
envisioned in the US will lead to a weak surveillance 
regime, while leaving the regulatory license intact.  
This paper is organised as follows. The second part 
briefly discusses the academic literature concerning 
credit ratings. The third part compares the US and EU 
regulatory frameworks. The fourth part analyses the 
differences in regulation in light of the previous 
theoretical discussion and the final part draws 
conclusions.  
2. Theoretical  Framework 
Although credit ratings are widely used and figure 
prominently in the financial press, no consensus on the 
reasons for such success exists. Some argue that credit 
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ratings contain no meaningful information, and are 
widely used only because of regulation; others contend 
that ratings are unavoidable because they balance 
accuracy with stability. Are credit ratings opinions or 
regulatory actions? The following section serves as a 
theoretical introduction to understanding why credit 
ratings exist, examines their use in capital markets and 
the issues with the leading agencies’ current business 
model.  
2.1  Credit Rating Agencies 
What exactly are credit rating agencies, and why do 
credit ratings exist? In spite of the mounting interest and 
growing body of literature on CRAs, the answer to these 
two ostensibly simple questions is hard to find. 
According to the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), “a credit rating is an assessment 
of how likely an issuer is to make timely payments on a 
financial obligation” (IOSCO, 2003, p. 3).
1 Are credit 
ratings therefore nothing but opinions on the credit-
worthiness of an issuing entity? This is what the agencies 
themselves successfully argue in US courts when seeking 
legal protection under the First Amendment from liability 
for their ratings.  
Table 1. Key figures for the ‘Big Three’ 
Sources: S&P website; Moody’s K-10 Filings; OSIRIS; Hoover’s  
Yet others dispute the notion of CRAs as pure analysts, 
and point to the quasi-regulatory role ratings have in 
financial markets (Kerwer, 2005). Because rating 
decisions have an important impact on credit flows, the 
                                                        
1 The three leading rating agencies agree with this definition. 
“Moody’s credit rating are opinions of the credit quality of 
individual obligations or of an issuer’s general 
creditworthiness” (Moody’s, 2008, p. 1); “A Standard & Poor’s 
issue credit rating is a current opinion of the creditworthiness 
of an obligor with respect to a specific financial obligation, a 
specific class of financial obligations, or a specific financial 
program” (S&P, 2008, p. 3); “Fitch’s credit ratings provide an 
opinion on the relative ability of an entity to meet financial 
commitments, such as interest, preferred dividends, repayment 
of principal, insurance claims or counterparty obligations” 
(http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/fitchResources.cfm?det
ail=1, accessed January 20, 2009). 
leading agencies – the argument goes – are tantamount to 
informal regulators. Some have argued that a look at the 
companies’ profitability confirms that CRAs are more 
than “financial gatekeepers” (Partnoy, 2006). For 
example, Moody’s revenues and profits more than 
doubled over 2002-2007 from $1,023 and $288 million in 
2002 to $2,259 and $710 million, respectively; its market 
capitalisation in 2007 was $10 billion in spite of having 
only $1.7 billion in assets. Other financial gatekeepers 
such as accounting and financial publishing firms face 
different competitive landscapes. On the one hand, 
accounting firms are legally liable for their actions, 
resulting in litigation costs and hefty settlement 
payments. On the other hand, competition in financial 
publishing is much stronger compared to the credit rating 
industry.
2  
There are also conflicting views on the reason for the 
success of credit ratings. The prevalent view is that credit 
ratings are useful in reducing information asymmetries 
between issuers and buyers of debt securities. Thanks to 
their access to privileged information on the issuer, the 
agencies can verify the obligor’s financial ability to repay 
its debt. In particular, small investment firms and 
unsophisticated investors – lacking the resources to 
establish large research departments – gain from the 
economies of scale of the leading CRAs. Another view 
holds that credit ratings help mitigate principal-agent  
 
problems by lowering the cost of monitoring agents 
(Gonzales et al., 2004, pp. 7-8). For instance, since asset 
managers do not have sufficient incentives to curb 
excessive risk-taking, investors can with contractual 
obligations ‘tie the hands’ of asset managers by forcing 
them to purchase only rated debt or, in some instances, 
only investment-grade securities.
3 
However, some of the empirical academic literature is 
sceptical about the role of credit ratings in providing 
                                                        
2 Significant financial publishing firms are: Dow Jones, 
Thomson-Reuters, Pearson PLC (owner of Financial Times 
and The Economist), Bloomberg, Associated Press, and smaller 
companies such as FactSet and Interactive Data. 
3 An international long-term security is considered investment-
grade if it has a rating above BBB- (S&P and Fitch) and Baa3 
(Moody’s).   
  Total 
Assets 
Turnover Net 
Income 
Operating 
Margin 
Market 
Capitalisation 
Business 
model 
Corporate 
governance 
Number of 
employees 
Moody’s 
Corporation 
         Issuer-pays  Publicly-
owned 
 
2002 $630  $1,023  $288  28.15%  $6,899      2,100 
2007 $1,714  $2,259  $701  31.03%  $10,063      3,600 
Standard and 
Poor’s 
         Issuer-pays  Private     
2003 n/a  $1,700  n/a  n/a  n/a      5,000 
2006 n/a  $2,750  n/a  n/a  n/a      8,500 
Fitch           Issuer-pays  Private   
2003 n/a  $505  $59.8  11.84%  n/a      1,502 
2004 n/a  $561  $62.1  11.06%  n/a      1,661 The Reform of the Credit Rating Agencies | 3 
useful information to investors. Hull, Predescu and White 
(2004) find that credit default swap spreads and bond 
yields largely anticipate the information contained in 
ratings’ changes. Cantor and Mann (2003) show that 
market-based measures such as bond spreads are more 
accurate in predicting short-term default risk than credit 
ratings. Nevertheless, credit ratings remain useful 
because they balance accuracy and stability, sacrificing 
some predicting power for lower volatility (Löffler, 
2004). Moreover, market-based measures may not be 
reliable for illiquid securities and lesser-known 
companies for which little public information is 
available.  
Whether one considers credit ratings as opinions or 
quasi-regulatory actions has important economic, 
political and regulatory consequences. These will be 
analysed in greater detail in section 4. Let us now turn to 
three important theoretical issues concerning the 
agencies’ business model: governance, transparency and 
competition. 
2.2 Governance 
The three leading credit rating agencies are for-profit 
organisations. Moody’s Corporation is the NYSE-listed 
holding company of Moody’s Investor Service (for 
simplicity: Moody’s); the American publisher NYSE-
listed McGraw-Hill is the owner of Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P), which does not have separate disclosure 
requirements; and finally the French financial company 
Fimalac listed on Euronext Paris as the majority owner of 
Fitch, which has two headquarters in New York and 
London.
4 
The most prominent issue with the agencies’ governance 
is their ‘issuer-pays’ business model. During the 1970s, 
CRAs switched to the ‘issuer-pays’ model from a 
‘subscriber-pays’ model because of increasingly complex 
securities in need of large resources, and the fear of 
declining revenues resulting from the dissemination of 
private ratings through new information technologies. 
Nobody raised concerns at the time. However, amid 
heightened criticism following the 1994 Mexican crisis 
and the 1997-98 Asian Financial crisis, CRAs have come 
under intense scrutiny (IMF, 1999, p. 136). Since the 
1990s when emerging economies’ borrowings expanded 
rapidly, sovereign and corporate ratings have become 
much more prominent in international bond markets. 
Critics pointed to the inherent conflict of interest in the 
‘issuer-pays’ business model, whereby agencies would 
value profits over ratings’ quality. In particular, because 
the agencies are paid by the entities that are the object of 
the judgement, CRAs would be under pressure to 
maintain market share by inflating ratings. This criticism 
re-emerged after the WorldCom and Enron collapses in 
the early 2000s. In spite of mounting calls for the 
                                                        
4 For detailed information on market shares, revenues, and 
legal structure of the agencies in the European market, see 
Annex 9.4 of European Commission (2008b). 
regulation of the industry, CRAs successfully fended off 
the attacks by arguing that keeping their reputation intact 
was a sufficient incentive to manage their conflicts of 
interest. The fact that US courts recognised ratings as 
‘opinions’, and granted them free speech protection from 
liability under the First Amendment certainly helped to 
avoid supervision (Partnoy, 2006, pp. 94-95).  
Another important governance issue is whether credit 
rating agencies should perform due diligence with regard 
to the information received by the issuer. Generally, 
CRAs do not check the information they are given, and 
they rate securities on the assumption that the data are 
correct (SIFMA, 2008, p. 5). For instance, in 2001 S&P 
and Moody’s both rated Enron as investment-grade until 
four days before the energy company declared 
bankruptcy – based on the misrepresentations of Enron’s 
executives. In the example of residential mortgage-based 
securities (RMBS), CRAs relied on flawed information 
provided by originators concerning underlying pools of 
subprime mortgages (Fitch, 2007).  
2.3 Transparency 
In theory, transparency should help to evaluate CRAs’ 
performance by reducing monitoring costs, and it should 
reduce over-reliance on ratings. For instance, disclosing 
rating methodologies and critical assumptions underlying 
ratings allows users to check whether the rating is fair 
and the analysis accurate. Moreover, it helps users 
understand the meaning of ratings and their possible 
shortcomings. Finally, it would encourage users to 
perform their own research based on the information 
made available.  
Transparency should also increase competition. For 
example, disclosing information regarding the accuracy 
of the ratings may help to sanction those agencies that do 
not meet certain criteria. Some may argue that too much 
transparency may harm innovation. Why should rating 
agencies develop new methodologies if they are forced to 
disclose their efforts? 
In the case of structured products, CRAs have used the 
same rating scale as corporate bonds, without releasing 
information on liquidity and volatility risk and on the 
uncertainties in pricing highly complex securities. As a 
consequence, triple-A senior tranches of collateralised 
debt obligations (CDO)
5 had – in the eyes of regulation 
and of less informed investors – the same degree of risk 
                                                        
5 Collateralised debt obligations are securities issued by special 
purpose vehicles on an underlying pool of fixed-income assets. 
Fixed-income assets can be credit card debt, corporate loans or 
bonds, residential or commercial mortgages or asset-backed 
securities. CDOs are divided in tranches with different levels of 
seniority, with senior being the highest. In case of difficulty in 
repayments on the underlying pool of debt, the most senior 
tranches are those that are paid first: from there the lower risk 
of default and higher rating.   4 | Piero Cinquegrana 
as triple-A corporate bonds.
6 As it turned out, the 
statistical models used to calculate the ratings of 
structured products were based on excessively thin 
samples and optimistic assumptions on default 
probabilities. Some have proposed that the agencies 
utilise different rating scales in light of the different 
nature of corporate bonds and complex securities. But 
originators – actors with a vested interest in the survival 
of securitisation – fiercely oppose such measures, arguing 
that it would represent a ‘stigma’ on structured securities. 
2.4 Competition 
The credit rating industry is oligopolistic with the three 
leading agencies controlling over 94% of the global 
market (European Commission, 2008b). In theory, 
competition ensures innovation, and it represents a 
healthy check on product quality. However, the rating 
business is entirely based on reputation. A certain 
contradiction between competition and reputation exists. 
The reputational capital the leading CRAs enjoy is 
enormous – the result of almost a century of successful 
activity. Investors trust CRAs’ judgement and they ask 
for a certain risk premium based on the issuer’s rating. 
Even after the subprime debacle, rating decisions are 
widely discussed in the financial press, highlighting their 
continuous importance. The same way a three-star 
Michelin restaurant can charge inflated prices for its 
food, highly-rated issuers can charge high prices for their 
bonds, resulting in lower interest rates. 
Because reputation is costly to establish and maintain, 
there is a ‘natural’ barrier of entry in the rating industry. 
Some argue that the so-called ‘regulatory license’ 
reinforces the oligopolistic nature of the rating industry 
(Partnoy, 1999). Remove ratings from regulation, the 
argument goes, and competition will result. Users will 
consider ratings for what they are – opinions – and they 
will be free to choose what value to assign to them. 
According to this view, rating opinions are so important 
precisely because they are ‘hardwired’ in global 
regulation. For instance, ‘credit triggers’ – clauses in loan 
covenants tied to ratings – bolster the value of ratings, in 
so far as companies must consider rating actions or face a 
loss of credit. Another example is Basel II where banks 
can choose the so-called Standardised Approach to 
calculate the risk-weighted capital requirements based on 
ratings of recognised External Credit Assessment 
Institutions (ECAIs).
7 
However, despite criticism of low informational content, 
there is evidence that investors use and value ratings, 
regardless of present regulation. In a recent survey of 
                                                        
6 A qualification is in order. Interest rates spreads paid on 
triple-A CDOs have been consistently higher than on triple-A 
corporate bonds. Market-based measures had been more 
prescient than ratings.  
7 Although some minor agencies are recognised in some 
jurisdictions, Fitch, S&P and Moody’s are universally 
recognised as ECAIs across Europe and Asia.  
asset managers in the US and Europe, Cantor et al. 
(2007) find that only 21% of respondents used ratings 
because they were mandated by regulation, while 59% of 
respondents used ratings because they were mandated by 
clients. Moreover, some respondents trusted ratings for 
pursuing a good investment strategy (25%). Thus, this 
seems to indicate that ratings are perceived to be a tool 
both to reduce information asymmetries between issuers 
and buyers, and to mitigate principal-agent problems. 
Considering that almost all the fund managers in the 
study cited Moody’s (98% of respondents), S&P (97%), 
and Fitch (70%) as rating agencies present in clients’ 
guidelines, this points to the high level of trust enjoyed 
by the incumbent CRAs. Indeed, the reputational barriers 
of entry to the business are extremely high.  
3. Regulation 
US regulation has employed credit ratings since the 
1930s without supervising CRAs. This dependence has 
certainly grown from the 1970s onwards. By contrast, EU 
regulation has only recently started to use ratings. The 
US enacted a regime of surveillance in 2006, while the 
EU intends to do so shortly. The following section 
overviews the supervisory frameworks of credit rating 
agencies in the US and Europe, and takes a look at the 
use of ratings in present regulation on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  
3.1 US  Approach 
US regulation became entangled with credit ratings 
during the 1930s, in response to the 1929 market crash. 
The Comptroller of the Currency issued the first act 
incorporating ratings in legislation in 1931, and the 
Federal Reserve followed in 1935 and 1936 (Partnoy, 
1999, pp. 686-690). Between the 1930s and the 1970s the 
use of ratings in regulation did not change significantly. 
Amid the credit crises of the early 1970s, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) amended Rule 15c3-1 
in 1975 to make capital requirements for brokers-dealers 
more risk sensitive, introducing for the first time the 
official denomination of Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Ratings Organization (NRSRO) (SEC, 1975). 
Since then, US regulation has grown to be highly 
dependent upon ratings in areas such as securities, 
pensions, banking, real estate, and insurance (Partnoy 
1999, p. 690). While the SEC failed to formally specify 
the criteria to assign NRSRO status, the term was widely 
used in state and federal regulation. Moreover, four 
CRAs that were recognised as NRSRO were eventually 
acquired by the three main CRAs, leading to a de facto 
state-sanctioned oligopoly (SEC, 2003, p. 9).  
The ambiguity in the NRSRO registration process 
persisted up to the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006, when Congress decided to act to inject competition 
and transparency in the rating industry. The legislation 
was the logical consequence of the perceived failure of 
credit rating agencies to predict the Enron bankruptcy of The Reform of the Credit Rating Agencies | 5 
2001 because of gross negligence. In section 702(b) of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress asked the SEC 
to issue a report on the role and function of CRAs in 
securities markets (SEC, 2003). The report’s main 
conclusions were that enhanced registration and oversight 
of CRAs were needed, and that increased transparency 
and competition would benefit the quality of ratings and 
represent a check to potential conflicts of interest. The 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (US Congress, 
2006) aimed at these objectives by granting rule-making, 
supervisory and enforcement powers to the SEC in order 
to oversee the credit rating industry, which was 
previously unregulated. Let us analyse the provisions in 
detail. 
Rating agencies that wish to be recognised as NRSRO 
apply to the SEC, furnishing information on:  
1)  ratings’ performance  
2)  procedures and methodologies to calculate ratings  
3)  policies to safeguard confidential information  
4)  organisational structure  
5)  code of ethics  
6)  conflicts of interest  
7)  20 largest clients  
8)  and written certifications on the part of “qualified 
institutional buyers” stating that they have used the 
agency for at least 3 years.  
The SEC may revoke or suspend the license if the CRA 
no longer satisfies the criteria of the initial application or 
in case of misuse of non-public information and/or 
infringement of conflicts of interest provisions. 
Moreover, it can impose sanctions if the NRSRO fails to 
maintain adequate financial and managerial resources. 
The NRSRO has to submit updates on the information 
delivered in case of any change as well as an annual 
report certifying the accuracy of the information. The 
statute explicitly forbids the SEC from issuing rules 
concerning the substance and the methodologies of the 
ratings. The SEC’s rule-making powers relate to: the 
prevention of misuse of non-public information; the 
management and disclosure of conflicts of interest; and 
the avoidance of unfair, coercive or abusive competitive 
practices. The Act also mandates that each NRSRO 
designate a compliance officer, and that it provide a 
confidential financial statement to the SEC.  
Based on the authority granted by the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act of 2006, the SEC proposed six rules 
on 2 February 2007, adopting the final rules on 23 May 
2007. The final rules determine the details of the 
application process, and they establish that a NRSRO 
should keep a record of rating actions, internal 
documents, auditing materials, and internal and external 
communications. The NRSRO or its employees should 
not use confidential information for personal profit, and 
the NRSRO should set policies and procedures to manage 
and disclose conflicts of interest defined as (1) issuer-
pays model (2) ancillary services (3) subscriber-pays 
model (4) employee owns any stake in a company rated 
by another employee (5) excessive involvement of an 
employee with the entity subject to rating. NRSROs 
should not (1) rate an entity whose business represents 
more than 10% of its total net revenue (2) rate an entity if 
the NRSRO or an employee involved in the rating 
decision own any stake in the company rated (3) rate an 
entity associated with themselves. As far as unfair, 
coercive, or abusive practices are concerned, a NRSRO 
should not tie the performance of its services to the 
purchase of other services, and should consistently use its 
preset procedures and methodologies independently from 
the services purchased by the rated entity (SEC, 2007). 
In light of the 2007-08 global financial crisis and 
mounting evidence of the responsibility of CRAs in the 
debacle, the SEC decided to propose a new, more 
stringent set of rules on 16 June 2008 and 1 July 2008 
regarding disclosure, conflicts of interest and reduction of 
reliance on ratings in regulation.
8 In a nutshell, the 
proposed rules: envision CRAs as ‘gatekeepers’ in 
disclosing extensive information on structured securities 
and statistics on performance of ratings; prohibit CRAs 
from providing advisory services; forbid analysts 
involved in rating decisions to negotiate fees and/or to 
receive gifts; keep records of deviations from models and 
third-party complaints; differentiate ratings for structured 
products; and, finally, to eliminate references to ratings in 
broker-dealers, money markets and other investment 
companies’ regulation. Some of the rules proposed are 
controversial. For instance, prohibiting NRSROs from 
engaging in any type of advisory services was considered 
excessive. By the same token, CRAs have criticised their 
proposed role as gatekeepers in disclosing information, 
arguing that the burden should fall on originators. 
Finally, both originators and CRAs oppose using 
different symbols for structured securities.  
3.2 European  Approach 
European Union legislation only recently started using 
ratings. The first piece of Community law explicitly 
mentioning CRAs was the market abuse regime’s 
implementing Directive 2003/125/EC, in which the 
agencies are encouraged to establish policies and 
procedures to ensure that ratings are fairly presented and 
disclose conflicts of interest. However, it was not until 
the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD)
9 that 
European legislators incorporated ratings in the law in 
order to assess the risk related to a certain financial 
assets. According to the CRD, EU financial institutions 
can use ratings of recognised ECAIs to calculate on a 
                                                        
8 For an excellent summary of the proposed rules, refer to 
http://www.chadbourne.com/clientalerts/2008/creditratings 
(accessed 28 January 2009). 
9 Directive 2006/48/EC, this directive implements the Basel II 
capital requirements.  6 | Piero Cinquegrana 
risk-weighted basis their minimum capital requirements. 
The recognition mechanism for ECAIs is described in 
Annex VI Part 2 of the CRD, whereby the rating agency 
should abide by standards of objectivity, independence, 
ongoing review, credibility, and transparency (European 
Commission, 2008a, p.4). However, the recognition 
mechanism did not grant any rule-making, supervisory or 
enforcement powers to ECAIs, as specified by the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors, or CEBS 
(CEBS, 2006, p. 1).  
In spite of the lack of formal regulation, the European 
Commission had been monitoring the credit rating 
industry closely. In particular, in July 2004 – in response 
to a European Parliament resolution in February 2004 
after the Enron and Parmalat scandals – the Commission 
asked the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR) for technical advice on possible avenues to 
supervise CRAs. CESR concluded that there was no need 
for formal regulation. In January 2006, the Commission 
agreed to these conclusions, but requested that CESR 
submit a yearly report of the implementation on the part 
of CRAs of the voluntary IOSCO Code of Conduct 
(IOSCO 2004).
10 As it became increasingly clear that 
CRAs played an important role in the ongoing financial 
crisis and that self-regulation was no longer a viable 
solution, in July 2008 the Commission decided to 
undertake the legislative path, issuing a consultative 
paper followed by a formal Regulation proposal in 
November 2008 (European Commission, 2008a). The 
Commission wishes the proposal be adopted by the 
Council in March 2009.  
The proposal takes the form of Regulation,
11 and sets four 
broad principles as the main objectives:  
1)  avoidance, or at least adequate management, of 
conflicts of interest  
2)  improvement of the quality of ratings and 
methodologies  
3)  enhanced transparency  
4)  efficient registration and surveillance.  
The proposal follows the Lamfalussy procedure, so that 
its details can be decided at the ‘comitology’ level. The 
Regulation would apply to rating agencies used for 
regulatory purposes, and banks and investment firms 
would use for capital calculations only ratings issued by 
registered CRAs. Moreover, ex art 4(2) investment firms 
and credit institutions “should not execute orders on 
                                                        
10 Both US and EU regulation reflect the principles contained 
in the IOSCO code. The main weaknesses of the code were the 
excessively general character of its principles and its lack of 
sanctions beside the usual ‘comply or explain’ approach of 
self-regulation.  
11 Regulation implies that once the legislation is adopted by the 
Council, it takes immediate effect across the Community 
following the publication in the Official Journal of the 
European Union.  
behalf of their clients” in regard to financial instruments 
rated by unregistered CRAs. This provision seems to 
imply that they may still deal on own account and engage 
in discretionary portfolio management when trading 
securities rated by unregistered CRAs, but they may not 
use such ratings in capital calculations. 
Among other rules contained in the legal text, CRAs 
should: avoid any conflict of interest; ensure its 
employees have sufficient knowledge and expertise; 
prohibit analysts from discussing fees with rated entities; 
establish a rotation mechanism; set compensation 
schemes rewarding accuracy; exercise due diligence with 
regard to the information received; record all downgrades 
and justification for such actions; review ratings in light 
of new macroeconomic conditions; immediately disclose 
changes in rating methodologies and review and re-rate 
past ratings in light of the new methodologies; either 
differentiate the rating scale for structured securities or 
provide a detailed report on the underlying assumptions; 
disclose policies and procedures for unsolicited ratings; 
identify unsolicited ratings with a different rating 
category; disclose detailed information on ratings’ 
performance; and, finally, publish a transparency report 
annually.  
As far as the registration process is concerned, CRAs that 
wish to be registered with the community must establish 
a subsidiary within the territory, and submit a registration 
to CESR. CESR will then transmit the registration to the 
home member state of the main subsidiary of the CRA 
and to other host member states with branches on their 
territories. The proposal mandates that home and host 
member states cooperate on registration, supervision and 
enforcement matters under the umbrella of CESR. The 
proposal also outlines in detail the powers of competent 
authorities, and sets principles relating to the sanctions 
applicable to CRAs in breach of the law. Finally, the 
proposal asks CESR to issue guidelines on 
implementation of the Regulation in order to achieve 
consistent application of the law across the EU territory. 
Two annexes are attached to the legal text that can be 
modified at level II by the Commission with the 
assistance of the European Securities Committee (ex art 
33(1)). The annexes contain rules on conflicts of interest 
and on the information that must be provided with the 
registration. A CRA’s supervisory board should include 
at least three non-executive independent members whose 
compensation is not tied to the company’s financial 
performance. The Reform of the Credit Rating Agencies | 7 
Table 2. Comparison between US and EU supervision of CRAs 
  Registration  Oversight  Conflicts of Interest  Transparency  Competition  Governance  Methodology 
US 
(The Credit 
Rating 
Agency 
Reform Act 
of 2006 and 
SEC final 
and proposed 
Rules) 
Registration at the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization 
(NRSRO). 
Application includes information on: 
1.  ratings’ performance 
2.  procedures and methodologies 
3.  policies against misuse of 
private information 
4.  organisational structure 
5.  code of ethics  
6.  conflicts of interest 
7.  20 largest issuers or subscribers 
8.  certification of institutional 
investors that the ratings are 
considered significant 
 
The SEC has sole 
responsibility for 
supervision. 
The SEC has no 
say in the ratings’ 
substance, 
procedures and 
methodologies. 
The SEC can 
suspend or limit 
operations or 
revoke the license 
if the NRSRO does 
not comply with 
the regulation or 
fails to maintain 
adequate resources 
to produce valid 
ratings. 
Appropriate policies and procedures to 
manage and address conflicts of interest. 
The SEC has the authority to issue rules 
concerning conflict of interests related to: 
1.Compensation  
2.Consulting and advisory services 
3.Personal and ownership conflicts 
4.Affiliation with issuers 
5.Other conflicts of interest the SEC 
deems necessary; 
 
prohibit an NRSRO from issuing a rating 
where the NRSRO or a person associated 
with the NRSRO has made 
recommendations as to structuring the 
same products that it rates; 
prohibit anyone who participates in 
determining a credit rating from 
negotiating the fee that the issuer pays for 
it, to prevent business considerations from 
undermining the NRSRO’s objectivity; 
prohibit gifts from those who receive 
ratings to those who rate them, in any 
amount over $25. 
Periodic private disclosure of financial conditions 
Require disclosure by the NRSROs of whether and 
how information about verification performed on the 
assets underlying a structured product is relied on in 
determining credit ratings.  
Require disclosure of how frequently credit ratings are 
reviewed; whether different models are used for 
ratings surveillance than for initial ratings; and 
whether changes made to models are applied 
retroactively to existing ratings.  
Require NRSROs to make an annual report of the 
number of ratings actions they took in each ratings 
class.  
Require documentation of the rationale for any 
material difference between the rating implied by a 
qualitative model that is a “substantial component” in 
the process of determining a credit rating and the final 
rating issued.  
Require NRSROs to differentiate the ratings they 
issue on structured products from other securities, 
either through issuing a report disclosing how 
procedures and methodologies and credit risk 
characteristics for structured finance products differ 
from other securities, or using different symbols, such 
as attaching an identifier to the rating. 
Require NRSROs to 
make all of their 
ratings and 
subsequent rating 
actions publicly 
available, to 
facilitate 
comparisons of 
NRSROs by 
making it easier to 
analyze the 
performance of the 
credit ratings the 
NRSROs issue in 
terms of assessing 
creditworthiness.  
Require NRSROs to 
publish 
performance 
statistics for one, 
three and ten years 
within each rating 
category, in a way 
that facilitates 
comparison with 
their competitors in 
the industry. 
Prohibit an NRSRO 
from issuing a rating 
on a structured 
product unless 
information on the 
characteristics of 
assets underlying the 
product is available, 
in order to allow other 
credit rating agencies 
to use the information 
to rate the product 
and, potentially, 
expose a rating 
agency whose ratings 
were unduly 
influenced by the 
product’s sponsors. 
Prohibition of use of 
non-public 
information for profit 
/ 
EU 
(Commission
’s Proposals 
SEC 
(2008)2745 
and SEC 
(2008)2746) 
CRAs whose ratings are used in regulation 
should be registered 
Single registration for the Community 
Coordination of CESR for the registration 
process 
Info for the registration 
1. full name of the credit rating agency, 
address of the registered office within the 
Community; 
2. name and contact details of a contact 
person; 
3. legal status; 
4. class of credit ratings for which the credit 
rating agency is applying to be registered; 
5. description of the procedures and 
methodologies used to issue and maintain 
credit ratings; 
6. policies and procedures to identify and 
manage conflicts of interests; 
7. information regarding employees; 
8. compensation arrangements; 
9. ancillary services; 
10. programme of operations, 
Convergence of 
sanctions across 
Member states 
CRAs 
headquartered 
outside the 
Community must 
establish a 
subsidiary within 
the Community. 
CRAs should limit their activities to 
issuing of credit ratings; ancillary services 
are permitted only if conflicts of interest 
do not arise. 
CRAs should establish policies and 
procedure to ensure conflicts of interest 
are properly managed. 
CRAs should try to avoid conflicts of 
interest. If conflicts of interest are 
unavoidable then they should be managed. 
Records of potential conflicts of interest as 
well as safeguards against those threats 
must be kept. 
CRA or its employees shall not rate an 
entity if they own a stake in the company. 
Either use different ratings for structured products or 
clearly disclosing information on the different types of 
risk 
Updates of methodologies must be disclosed before 
these enter into effect. All changes should lead to a 
review of previous ratings 
Disclose policies and procedures for unsolicited 
ratings 
Disclose information on rated entity whose business 
represents more thant 5% of annual revenue 
Present ratings with extensive information on 
assumptions, people involved, limitations 
Disclose rules on conflicts of interest, definition of 
ancillary services, compensation schemes, 
methodologies, 20 largest clients and largest 
contributors to company’s growth 
  No preliminary rating 
assessment is 
allowed. 
Rotation of analysts is 
required. 
CRA’s supervisory 
boards should include 
at least three 
independent, non-
executive members 
whose remuneration 
shall not be 
dependent on the 
agency’s 
performance. 
Adequate financial 
and human resources 
must be dedicated to 
monitoring, updating, 
and issuing of credit 
ratings. 
Methodologies 
should be rigorous, 
systematic, 
continuously 
updated and backed 
by historical data.  
The CRA should 
ensure that the 
information 
provided by the 
issuer is reliable. 
Ratings should be 
reviewed in light of 
new 
macroeconomic 
conditions. 8 | Piero Cinquegrana 
A CRA should establish an independent review function 
competent to periodically review methodologies and the 
adequacy of those methodologies to new financial 
instruments. A CRA should also disclose information on 
rated entity whose business represents more than 5% of 
its annual revenue. Other measures include: a CRA or its 
employees should not rate entities if they own a stake in 
the company that is the object of the judgement; a CRA 
should not provide consultancy services; a CRA should 
keep records of activities and communications for 5 
years; a CRA should ensure its employees do not misuse 
private information; a CRA should present the rating 
decision with extensive information on underlying 
assumptions, people involved, the meaning and the 
methodologies used, and its limitations. Regarding 
disclosure, a CRA should disclose publicly its rules on 
conflicts of interest, its definition of ancillary services, its 
compensation schemes, its methodologies, its 20 largest 
clients and its largest contributors to the company’s 
growth. The following information is required for the 
registration:  
1)  legal status, addresses and contact personnel  
2)  rating procedures and methodologies  
3)  policies to identify and manage conflicts of interest  
4)  information regarding employees  
5)  compensation arrangements 
6)  ancillary services. 
4. Regulatory  Analysis 
As evidenced by the above description of the European 
and American supervisory frameworks towards CRAs, 
the Commission’s proposal (“the proposal”) stands in 
stark contrast to The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 
(“the Act”) of 2006 and subsequent SEC’s final and 
proposed rules. First, in spite of the proclaimed search for 
US-EU cooperation and some convergence in the actual 
and proposed rules, the underlying objectives of the 
regulatory interventions are very different. Second and 
somewhat consequently, the proposal goes far beyond the 
Act in regulating the agencies, and it is a step towards 
cementing the status quo. As far as the objectives are 
concerned, the Act aims at injecting competition into the 
rating industry, while the proposal aims at enacting a 
regime of strong surveillance.
13 Both share the goals of 
transparency and accountability, but the proposal seeks 
accountability through enforcement whilst the Act seeks 
accountability through market discipline. The divergent 
goals are the result of different analyses of the rating 
industry and of different degrees of faith in the market. In 
order to understand the dissimilar approaches, it is 
necessary to step back for a moment and consider the 
logic behind the interventions.  
                                                        
13 Some elements of surveillance are present in SEC rules but 
not to the extent of the Commission’s proposal. 
Information goods such as credit ratings may be 
considered quasi-public goods, which are by definition 
non-rivalled and non-excludable. Non-rivalled means that 
the consumption of the good does not reduce its 
availability to others; non-excludable means that no-one 
can be effectively excluded from using the good. The 
property of non-excludability in credit ratings emerged 
with the widespread use of information technologies 
capable of reproducing and disseminating the ratings at 
virtually no cost.
14 If credit ratings are quasi-public 
goods, then the government should be in charge of 
providing them (public-utility model). However, 
governments are themselves in conflict because CRAs 
must rate sovereign entities. Market-mechanisms are 
generally better at insulating themselves from political 
pressure than government entities. Moreover, heavy state 
intervention may hamper innovation in the production of 
ratings. Thus a free market in the demand and supply of 
information seems to be the only optimal solution to 
provide credit ratings. Arguably the inclusion of ratings 
in regulations since the 1930s in the US and since the 
early 2000s in the EU amounts to outsourcing the 
production of the public good ‘credit ratings’ to private 
entities. 
There are two opposing views of the functioning of the 
credit rating industry: the “reputational capital” view and 
“regulatory license” view (Partnoy, 1999). The 
reputational capital view contends that the rating industry 
is competitive and reputation-driven. The three leading 
CRAs have acquired the trust of investors thanks to their 
meaningful analyses contained in ratings, and investors 
demand lower or higher interest rates based on ratings, 
which reflect the credit-worthiness of the rated entities. 
Reputation ensures that the agencies maintain ratings’ 
quality for fear of losing the trust of investors and, as a 
consequence, market shares. By contrast, the regulatory 
license view argues that since ratings are embedded in 
regulation, CRAs do not sell information but regulatory 
licenses. The regulatory license allows the rated entity to 
enjoy some benefits with respect to regulation. In spite of 
the low informational content, ratings remain meaningful 
because they are present in regulation. Moreover, state 
registration of CRAs increases barriers of entry, 
reinforcing the value of the license.  
In the eyes of US regulators, the regulatory license view 
is an accurate depiction of the present state of the credit 
rating industry. The Act aims at re-establishing a 
situation whereby the reputational capital view would 
prevail. Put differently, US authorities are convinced that 
they can create a competitive, reputation-based credit 
rating industry, in which different opinions compete to 
                                                        
14 One can argue that subscription-based CRAs can overcome 
the problem of non-excludability. However, the most 
successful CRAs employ the ‘issuer-pays’ model to prevent the 
dissemination of ratings (free-rider problem) and to ensure 
sufficient revenues to cover the costs of analysing an ever-
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gain the trust of investors. By lowering barriers of entries, 
enhancing transparency and removing the regulatory 
license, competition will follow. The same way 
newspapers compete to establish their reputation as 
authoritative observers of politics and business, so should 
CRAs strive to provide accurate opinions on the credit-
worthiness of issuing entities. Some economists are 
equally convinced that competition is the right answer to 
solve the issues with CRAs (Portes, 2008; Goodhart, 
2008). Others argue that ratings should have a warning 
signalling that they are detrimental to one’s financial 
health, in a similar fashion to packets of cigarettes (de 
Grauwe, 2009). However, there is a fundamental 
dilemma that these visions fail to address. No 
replacement for credit ratings in regulation exists. Credit 
default swaps (CDS) spreads and bond yields are 
extremely volatile, and they would exacerbate the pro-
cyclicality of financial regulation. Additionally, the lack 
of liquidity of CDS and bonds in certain segments of the 
market represents a further obstacle in replacing credit 
ratings. If regulation aims to remain risk-sensitive 
without exasperating the business cycle, credit ratings are 
here to stay and so is the regulatory license.  
Although the US solution is optimistic in envisioning a 
fundamental restructuring of the credit rating industry, 
the European approach represents a seal on the status 
quo. The stringent supervisory regime suggests that 
European authorities do not see any alternative to the 
‘regulatory license’ scenario. Tellingly, ‘competition’ is 
not even mentioned as an underlying objective of the 
proposal, while it figures prominently in the title of the 
Act. By outsourcing the production of the public good 
‘credit ratings’ to private companies, the Commission is 
convinced that it must closely monitor their actions and 
provide governance guidelines in order to ensure the 
quality and accuracy of the information. The organisation 
and conduct of business requirements are burdensome, 
and are likely to raise barriers of entry in the industry. 
The proposal interferes with the agencies’ business 
model, also providing standards for their methodology. 
By contrast, the Act explicitly forbids the SEC from 
interfering with the content and methodologies of ratings.  
However, if credit ratings are a quasi-public good – and 
we are convinced that they are – the position of the 
Commission is defendable on several fronts. First, as 
discussed above, risk-sensitive regulation requires 
measures that balance accuracy with stability. No 
realistic alternative to credit ratings balancing these 
objectives exists. Second, self-regulation has failed to 
ensure the accuracy of ratings, leading to rating inflation 
and poor performance. Third, ‘natural’ barriers of entry 
in the rating industry are high. Incumbent CRAs enjoy 
enormous reputational capital, regardless of the 
regulatory license. For instance, an absence of ‘red tape’ 
in the European market in the 1990s did not see the 
emergence of significant European competitors to the 
leading CRAs. Fourth, competition and reputation are at 
odds. Provided that the rating industry is based on 
reputation, it is unlikely that significant competition will 
arise because the market tends to coalesce towards two or 
three highly-reputed agencies. Were significant 
competition to arise and with it decreasing margins, 
CRAs would be tempted to lower prices and ratings 
quality to gain market shares (Becker & Milbourn, 2008). 
In a nightmare scenario, issuers would shop around for 
ratings among several competitors, looking for the 
highest one. And if authorities are incapable of removing 
the regulatory license, then banks and investment firms 
would choose those ratings that allow them to retain the 
lowest capital ratios, regardless of quality. This scenario 
would represent a threat to financial stability. Since credit 
ratings must be incorporated in legislation, public 
authorities have the duty to set minimum criteria for 
CRAs. Doing otherwise would represent a complete 
abdication of responsibility. 
That said, several criticisms could be brought to the 
details of the proposal. First, the proposal should outline 
general principles in the legal text concerning conflicts of 
interest, governance, and disclosure, and then specify 
detailed rules in the annexes. In that way, it would 
provide more flexibility for possible changes because the 
annexes can be modified at Level II without the 
involvement of the Parliament and the Council. But there 
are several instances in which the legal text is extremely 
detailed and rule-based such as arts 6(4), 7(4) and (5), 
and 8(3) and (5). Second, by regulating CRAs so heavily, 
the Commission may give the impression of certifying 
ratings. However, ratings cannot be relied upon 
completely. Investors should make their own risk 
assessments, using credit ratings as one of the factors to 
be included in the investment decision. To this end, the 
Commission should undertake initiatives to educate 
investors on the limitation of ratings, and to reduce 
dependence on ratings. Nevertheless, mounting 
complexity and diversity in financial products rather than 
regulation may be the prime cause of over-reliance on 
ratings because investors do not have the expertise or 
resources to research on each product. Moreover, risk 
management departments of investment firms have 
emerged heavily battered from the ongoing financial 
crisis. This weakens the argument for relying more on 
risk management and less on external credit assessment. 
Overall, it appears that credit ratings are necessary in 
today’s financial markets.  
To summarise, in a world of information asymmetries, 
principal-agent problems, mounting complexity and 
diversity of financial products, network economies due to 
the nature of the rating business and the necessity of risk-
sensitive regulation, external credit assessment appears 
unavoidable. While it is likely to raise barriers of entry, 
the Commission’s proposal aims at restoring confidence 
in the production of credit ratings and set minimum 
governance standards for CRAs.  10 | Piero Cinquegrana 
5. Conclusion 
Credit ratings are necessary for risk-sensitive regulation, and to reduce information asymmetries and principal-agent 
problems in financial markets. Private CRAs are best-suited to providing independent assessments of the credit-
worthiness of an issuing entity. However, natural barriers of entry in the rating industry and widespread conflicts of 
interest have led to a deterioration in the quality of ratings. Self-regulation and market discipline have not worked. 
Although the European Commission’s proposal cements the status quo by further raising barriers of entry in the industry, 
it appears as the only viable solution. The competition and transparency envisioned in the US are likely to result in a weak 
surveillance regime, while leaving the regulatory license intact. Because ratings balance accuracy with stability, no viable 
alternative exists. Increasing competition may reduce the reputational incentives to ensure the quality of ratings. 
Moreover, the widespread failure of internal risk management in the banking sector suggests that reducing the role of 
external ratings in regulation is risky. Thus, strong provisions and a strict surveillance regime to police rating agencies are 
appropriate. There is nevertheless room for some improvement of the Commission’s approach, such as increased 
flexibility in the governance rules mandated for CRAs, concerted efforts to educate investors on the limitation of ratings, 
and initiatives to ensure that ratings are not the sole parameter in the investment decision. 
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